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TAKINGS AND RETROACTIVITY
Jan G. Laitos
I. INTRODUCTION
A Summary
While the Takings Clause of the United States Constitution has lately been
receiving much attention from the United States Supreme Court, another concept
closely linked to takings - retroactivity - has been o f even more interest to the
Court recently. In 1994, the Court is expected to decide at least five important
retroactivity cases, many of which will help better define the contours of the
Takings Clause. It is the retroactivity of a law, perhaps moreso than the law’s
potential to “take” private property, that should be of greatest interest to those
wishing to challenge a law that burdens property.
When a private party alleges that a law has “taken” that party’s private
property, it is often the retroactive aspects of the law that causes the psychological
harm that precipitates the takings litigation. Typically, decisions involving
property are made pursuant to and consistent with existing law. The law which
allegedly “takes” the property is a law which changes that existing law, so as to
either deprive the property owner o f a pre-existing right, or impose a new duty. It
is the fact of a change in the law, applied to existing expectations regarding the
property, arising under then-existing law, which produces both the economic

harm, and the feeling (on the part of the property owner) that it has been somehow
unfair to impose the new law retroactivity.
Throughout the 19th and early part of the 20th centuries, retroactivity was
an independent basis for voiding laws which interfered with so-called “vested
rights.” However, beginning in the 1940s, retroactivity became only one of
several factors to consider in assessing whether a law affecting private property
had violated the Takings or Due Process Clauses. Rather than focus on the
retroactive nature of the law in question, other factors (e.g., the likelihood of the
law advancing a legitimate state interest) became more important to courts
considering a law’s constitutionality. The presence or absence o f a vested right in
the property affected was largely irrelevant, in part because property was
increasingly viewed as being comprised as a "bundle of sticks," where the nature
of the stick impacted by the law was the critical determination.
The current law of retroactivity has returned to a "vested rights” test. See
Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 1994 WL 144450 (U.S., April 26, 1994)
[hereinafter Landgraf]. Moreover, the retroactive nature and effect of a law is not
just a factor to consider as part of a takings analysis. In many cases, the fact of a
law's retroactivity will cause of the law in question to be a taking. This will occur
in two situations: First, a law affecting private property will likely be a taking of
that property when the law manifests "primary" retroactivity altering the past legal
consequences of past private behavior. Second, a law affecting private property
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may also be a taking if (1) the law constitutes "secondary" retroactivity (altering
the future legal consequences of past private behavior), and (2) the property
affected has "protected legal status" (i.e., the Taking Clause protects the property
from secondary retroactive application of the law).

B. References
Jan G. Laitos, Retroactivity: Underlying Principles (1994).
James T. Kainen The Historical Framework for Reviving Constitutional
Protection of Property and Contract Rights, 79 Cornell L. Rev. 87 (1993).
Charles B. Hochman, The Supreme Court and the Constitutionality of
Retroactive Legislation, 73 Harvard L. Rev. 692 (1960).
W. David Slawson, Constitutional and Retroactive Lawmaking, 48 Cal. L.
Rev. 216 (1960).
Elmer E. Smead, The Rule Against Retroactive Legislation: A Basic
Principle of Jurisprudence, 20 Minn. L. Rev. 775 (1936).

II. HISTORY OF RETROACTIVITY
A. Vested-Rights Retroactivity
Retroactivity was an organizing principle in constitutional protection of
private property prior to the development o f substantive due process. The leading
definition of a retroactive law was offered by Justice Story in Society for the
Propagation of the Gospel v. Wheeler, 22 F. Cas. 756 (C.C.D.N.H. 1814): "[A
retroactive law] takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under existing laws,
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or creates a new obligation, imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability in
respect to transactions or considerations already past.” Under this definition, the
critical retroactive element of a law was not whether the law took effect before its
applicable date, but whether it operated so as to alter some pre-existing legal
interest One hundred and eighty years later, in Landgraf (1994), the Supreme
Court returned to this conception of retroactivity.
Vested rights retroactivity permitted lawmakers to change rules affecting
property interests without violating the proscription against altering pre-existing
rights deemed to be vested. Retroactive laws could still reach all interests not
defined as being vested, thereby avoiding the freezing of existing property rules
that would have occurred if they had been immune from legislative change. See,
e.g., Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 386 (1798); Watson v. Mercer, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 88
(1834).

B. The Rise of Substantive Due Process and the Decline of
Retroactivity
Between the 1930s and the latter part of the 20th century, interference with
existing property rights was largely judged according to substantive due process
standards, and not according to vested rights retroactivity. Under due process
analysis, a law's retroactive effect was only a factor to consider; it was not
determinative. Moreover, vested rights were no longer thought to be a useful test
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for whether retroactive laws were valid. This was because commentators and
courts believed that the term "vested right" was conclusory, and most often used to
justify the invalidation of a retroactive law that was defective for reasons other
than the law’s impact on vested rights.
The substantive due process test began to play the same role as vesting
analysis once did. Under substantive due process, the question was not the effect
o f the retroactive law on a vested right, but the usefulness of retroactivity as a
means of carrying out the goal of the law. Usery v. Turner Elkhom Mining Co.,
428 U.S. 1 (1976). Retroactivity continued to have independent viability only in
one specialized context. This was when a property owner had in good faith relied
upon acts or assurances by government officials, and in doing so had made such a
substantial change in position that it would be inequitable to take away rights
acquired as a result of this reliance. In such a case, the government was equitably
estopped from retroactivity disturbing existing rights.
This government estoppel theory was eventually adopted by the Supreme Court as
a test to be used in takings analysis. In Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York
City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978), the Court stated that one factor that should be taken into
account when determining whether a regulation effects a taking was whether it had
"interfered with reasonable investment-backed expectations." A reasonable investmentbacked expectation had to more than an unilateral expectation or "an abstract need."
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1005 (1984). There could be no taking
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based on the "expectation" theory advanced in Penn Central if the private property owner
affected by the retroactive law had either long been subject to similar laws, or somehow
been put on notice that a change in the law was inevitable. Concrete Pipe and Products
of California v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust, 113 S.Ct. 2264, 2291-2 (1993).
Most private parties affected by retroactive federal legislation focus on the
degree to which the new law has interfered in the future with past economic
investments. The Supreme Court, on the other hand, because o f its disinclination
to find takings, instead concentrates its attention on whether a private party’s
expectations are "reasonable," and the nature of the "expectation" that allegedly
has been interfered with by the retroactive law. An expectation that an existing
federal law will not change is not reasonable when the party affected by the
change has notice of the likelihood of some future change. United States v. Locke,
471 U.S. 84, 106 (1985). This notice can be constructive, and be implied if those
subject to the new law operate in a heavily regulated field. FHA v. The Darlinton,
Inc., 358 U.S. 84, 91 (1958). An expectation is not reasonable if the party
asserting its interference has, prior to the changed law, voluntarily assumed the
risk of some subsequent change. Yee v. City of Escondido, 112 S.Ct. 1522, 1531
(1992). An expectation also may not be reasonable if it is held by someone other
than the party alleging the taking. Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 715 (1987).
Nor does a private party have an expectation that immunizes it from
subsequent federal legislation if that party's prior legal relationship with a federal
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entity belies any reliance on the absence of future legislative amendments. Two
aspects of the prior legal relationship produce a presumption that the expectation
should be one of change, and not one of no change. First, if the party alleging a
taking has "long been subject to federal regulation, [then] [t]hose who do business
in the regulated field cannot object if the legislative scheme is buttressed by
subsequent amendments to achieve the legislative end.” Locke, supra at 106 n. 15.
Second, if the complaining party has a contract with the federal government,
whose consequences are then altered by subsequent legislation, there is no taking
if the terms of the contract have provided notice that future change is possible.
Even if a private party has a reasonable expectation of no change, there is still not
a taking if that party’s investment-backed expectations "can continue to be realized
as long as he complies with, reasonable regulatory restrictions. . . ” Cisneros v.
Alpine Ridge Group, 113 S.Ct. 1898, 1902-03 (1993).
Perhaps the only expectation that will be consistently protected by the Court is one
that is explicitly guaranteed by the federal government. When, for example, a federal
statute gives a company explicit assurances that a federal agency is prohibited from
disclosing publicly any data submitted to the agency by the company, the company's
security in the confidentiality o f the data has protected legal status, immunizing it
(through the Takings Clause) from legislative amendments retroactivity authorizing
disclosure of the date. Ruckelshaus, supra at 1011.
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By the 1990s, retroactivity was increasingly viewed as a component o f both
substantive due process and takings analyses. It was not usually an independent
grounds for invalidating laws. See Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. R.A. Gray
& Co., 467 U.S. 717 (1984); Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., 475
U.S. 211 (1986). Vested rights retroactivity had been largely abandoned by the
courts. To the extent retroactivity survived at all as an argument against laws
which interfered with property, it was usually in the context o f takings claims.
And as a factor to consider in takings cases, it was relatively insignificant.

III. MODERN RETROACTIVITY
A. Manifestations of Retroactivity
There are three general ways by which a law can be retroactively applied:
Legislative Enactments - When there is a statute, there is a presumption that
it is to be prospective only. This presumption can be overcome only if there is
clear legislative intent that the statute is to be retroactive. Landgraf; Mojica v.
Gannett Co., 7 F.3d 552 (7th Cir. 1993); U.S. v. TRW, Inc., 4 F.3d 416 (6th Cir.
1993); Bradley v. Pizzaco of Nebraska, 7 F.3d 795 ( 8th Cir. 1993).
Administrative Rules - The Supreme Court has noted that administrative
rules must be statements that have legal consequences only for the future. Bowen
v. Georgetown University Hospital, 488 U.S. 204 (1988). They are permitted if
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the power to promulgate them is conveyed by Congress in express terms. CalAlmond, Inc. v. U.S. Dept of Agriculture, 14 F.3d 429,442 (9th Cir. 1993).
Court Decisions - In 1993, in Harper v. Virginia Department of Taxation,
113 S.Ct. 2510 (1993), the Supreme Court held that when a court applies a new
rule of federal law to the parties before it, the new rule must be given full
retroactive effect (1) in all cases still open on direct review, and (2) to all events
predating the new rule. When a court explicitly leaves open all questions
regarding the retroactive application of its decision, and does not apply the new
rule to the parties before it, a case-by-case balancing of several factors determines
whether the new decision is to have retroactive effort. Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson,
404 U.S. 97 (1971). Ferguson v. Roberts, 11 F.3d 696, 700-01 (7th Cir. 1993).

B. L andgraf and the R eturn of Vested Rights Retroactivity
On April 26, 1994, the Landgraf Court signalled a return to vested rights
retroactivity, as well as the possible emergence of retroactivity as a separate
ground for attacking laws that affect private property rights. The majority opinion
creates a presumption of prospectivity for all non-judicial law changes, rebuttable
only by evidence of legislative intent to the contrary. Landgraf reminds us that
antiretroactivity presumptions are founded in fairness — in the idea that the
persons should conform their conduct according to what the law is. To do
otherwise is to allow law makers "to sweep away settled expectations suddenly,"
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and to shake "people['s] confidence about the legal consequences o f their actions."
Prospective application of new laws, on the other hand, is consistent with (1) the
need for "notice,” (2) the equities of "reliance,” (3) the benefits of "predictability"
and "stability" when laws seek to reach contractual and property rights, and (4) the
value associated with certainty in “planning.”
The Court's constitutional concern with retroactivity revolves around a
retroactive law's effect on “vested rights.” Not only does the Landgraf opinion
adopt Justice Story's definition of impermissible retroactive legislation (“statutes
which, though operating from their passage, affect ‘vested rights’”), it also
redefines the Takings Clause as preventing government actions from “depriving
private persons of vested property rights except for a ‘public use’ and upon
payment of ‘just compensation.’” The court's adoption of a vested rights test is
criticized in Justice Scalia's concurring opinion as being both inadequate as an
approach to retroactivity and inconsistent with other Court cases involving
retroactivity. The majority is nonetheless firm that the Court's new retroactivity
rule prohibits "giv[ing] to statutes a retrospective operation, whereby rights
previously vested are injuriously affected."
The Court also seems to create three classes of retroactive laws. Depending
upon what class it falls within, the law will be more or less likely to be voided for
being impermissibly retroactive.
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C. Primary Retroactivity, Secondary Retroactivity with Non-Protected
Legal Status, and Secondary Retroactivity with Protected Legal Status
There is some consensus on what retroactivity is, and what it is not. Three
examples of legal actions can be called retroactive, although only one of the three
is certain to be void as a matter of law for being impermissible retroactive.
Example #1 is a law which alters the past legal consequences of past private
actions. This is as "primary" retroactivity. Assume that a developer purchases a
parcel of land in 1970 which is zoned with a one-half acre minimum lot size.
Pursuant to this zoning classification, the developer builds twelve homes on onehalf acre lots on the six acres. In 1995 the zoning authority changes the minimum
lot size to two acres, and makes the new zoning restriction retroactive to 1970.
The effect of the new zoning law is that in 1970 the developer had permission to
build only three houses on the six acres. The 1995 zoning change has altered the
past legal consequences (building a home on one-half acre lots is permissible prior
to 1995) of past private actions (the developer built home on one-half acre lots
prior to 1995). Such primary retroactivity is almost surely void. The Landgraf
decision terms these laws as “explicitly retroactive legislation, i.e., statutes . . .
enacted to take effect from a time anterior to their passage.” See also Ralis v.
RFE/RL, Inc., 770 F.2d 1121, 1127 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
Example #2 is a law which alters the future legal consequences of past
private actions. Laws which have exclusively future effect, but which affect the
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legal future consequences o f past private behavior, and thereby expectations
arising from past action, are characterized as "secondary" retroactivity. This is by
far the most frequently occurring form of retroactivity. Assume that the developer
in the above paragraph purchased six acres in 1970, when the land use planning
laws permitted houses to be built on one-half acre lots, but did not do anything
with the land for 25 years. Assume also that in 1995 the zoning was changed to
permit only a two-acre minimum lot size, but that this change, unlike the change in
Example #1, is to be effective only after 1995. Although seemingly prospective in
application, the new law has a retroactive effect on the past actions of the
developer. The developer may have purchased the land in 1970 with the
expectation that it would continue to be zoned for one-half acre lots, permitting
eventual construction of up to twelve homes. The 1995 change permits only three
homes, thus having an economic effect on the decision to buy in 1970, where that
decision may have been made on the assumption that the lot size requirements
would not be altered, and that twelve homes could someday be built. Despite the
fact that the economic consequences could be severe for facts originating
antecedent to the new law, this kind of secondary retroactivity is usually thought
to be acceptable..
Secondary retroactivity affecting private actions that have no protected legal
status is sometimes not termed retroactivity at all. The Landgraf decision refers to
this kind of secondary retroactivity when it says “[a] statute does not operate
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‘retrospectively’ merely because it is applied in a case arising from conduct
antedating the statute’s enactment, or upsets expectations based on prior law.” See
also Fleming v. Rhodes 331 U.S. 100, 107 (1947) (“federal regulation of future
action based upon rights previously acquired by the person regulated is not
prohibited by the Constitution”); Dyce v. Salaried Employees’ Pension Plan, 15
F.3d 163, 166 (11th Cir. 1994); Pinnock v. International House House of
Pancakes, 844 F. Supp. 574 (S.D. Cal. 1993).
Example #3 is a law which alters the future legal consequences of past
private action, but unlike Example #2, those past private actions may have
protected legal status with respect to the new law. This third kind of retroactivity
may be characterized as “legal status" retroactivity, because the new law is
affecting neither the past legal consequences o f past private actions (primary
retroactivity), nor just the future legal consequences of past private actions
(secondary retroactivity). The new law is also affecting the future consequences
of past private actions which may have some legal status regarding the new law. If
the past action has provided the party with “protected” legal status, a law affecting
only the future legal effect of the past action may be void for interfering in the
future with a previously protected legal status. If the past action has resulted in
legal status, but not protected status, the normal presumptions of the validity of
secondary retroactivity will apply, and the new law will survive.
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In the case of the developer who purchased the six acres in 1970, assume
that in 1980 the land was platted by the county under then current law to provide
for twelve homes on the six acres, consistent with the then-applicable one-half
acre minimum lot size requirement. Assume that no homes are built before 1995,
but in 1995 the county changes the minimum lot size to two acres, and then
abolishes all platting for which construction has not begun, effective in 1995. The
1980 platting has been abolished, the new two-acre minimum lot size requirement
does not permit the twelve homes to be built on the 12 platted lots, and the legal
status (the 1980 platting) of past private actions (the 1970 purchase of the land)
has been altered in the future by the 1995 law. The difficult, and often-litigated
question is whether the past legal status (the platting) is “protected,” thereby
preventing its future alteration. The ability of the law to operate on past actions
usually depends on the precise nature and character of the legal status of these past
actions under the past law. See, e.g. L.M. Everhart Construction v. Jefferson
County Planning Com’n, 2 F.3d 48 (4th Cir. 1993) (approval of a subdivision plat
does not create a vested right); Friends of the Law v. King County, 869 P.2d 1056
(Wash. 1994) (approval of preliminary plat did create a vested right).
The Landgraf opinion seems to assume that private actions have protected
legal status with respect to retroactive laws in one of two situations. First,
protected legal status attaches when the law “takes away or impairs vested rights
acquired under existing laws.” This occurs when there is a vested right, and the
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right is impaired by retroactive application of the new law. See, e.g., United States
v. Stella Perez, 839 F.Supp. 92 (D.P.R. 1993); Saint Vincent Hospital and Health
Center v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield o f Montana, 862 P.2d 6 (Mont. 1993). The
Court seems to define a vested right as a right associated with an event that is
“completed” before operation of the new begins (“transactions already
completed”). See also Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423,430 (1987) (“a law is
retrospective if it ‘changes the legal consequences of acts completed before its
effective date.”).
Several, there is protected legal status when a law retroactivity “creates a
new obligation, imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability or liability for
transactions already past.” See e.g., Edwards v. Edwards, 863 P.2d 513 (Or. App.
1993); OSI Industries v. Utah State Tax Com’n, 860 P.2d 381 (Utah App. 1993)

IV. TAKINGS AND RETROACTIVITY
Case law tends to simplify the three definitions of retroactivity by relying
on a dichotomy: A law is considered to operate prospectively (and permissibly)
when it implicates conduct occurring on or after the law's effective law.
Conversely, a law is considered retroactive (and preemptively impermissible)
when it alters the legal consequences of conduct occurring before the law’s
effective date. O f course, often it is difficult to characterize a law as either
retroactive or prospective, because even if the law is made applicable to
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transactions or conduct occurring after the law’s effective date, such a law may
indirectly, and significantly, affect the outcome of transactions and conduct
occurring before its effective date. Most courts deal with this reality by relying on
A

the following rule: A law does not operate retroactively simply because its
application requires some reference to antecedent facts.
The case law dichotomy between prospective and retroactive laws is
roughly the difference between “secondary” and “primary” retroactivity. In the
former case (secondary retroactivity, or prospectivity), the future legal effect o f a
present action is changed, even if the present action originated in the past, and will
become less desirable in the future. In the latter case (primary retroactivity, or
retroactivity), an act lawful when completed in the past becomes unlawful by
operation of new law.
Case law also recognizes a third kind of factual situation which may
precipate retroactivity concerns. This is when past actions or transactions have
resulted in the creation of past legal rights, duties, or limitations with respect to
such actions/transactions. In such a case, a law is deemed to be impermissibly
retroactive if it “takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under existing law,
or creates a new obligation, imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability in
respect to transactions or considerations already past.” This third rule of
retroactivity, adopted by the Landgraf Court, is similar to “legal status
retroactivity,” because the legal difficulty with the law is not because it operates in
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the future on past private behavior (secondary retroactivity), but because it affects
the future legal effect of past actions that in the past may have had some kind of
protected legal status. The Takings Clause provides the most protected legal status
to private actions affected by secondary retroactivity. See United States v.
Security Industrial Bank, 459 U.S. 70 (1982); Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v.
Radford, 295 U.S. 555 (1935).
Perhaps the easiest way to understand retroactivity is to visualize a time
line which begins with the "old law," and ends with the future legal effects of a
“new law” on facts arising either under the "old" or "new" law. The general
chronological sequence of retroactivity starts with the old, pre-existing law.
Pursuant to this law, or in reliance on this law, or with this law as a backdrop,
private actions take place. These private actions can take one of three forms.
First, they may be plans or preliminary decisions that are neither completed nor
given any legal status before the new law is adopted. Using the example of the
developer of the six acres, this kind of private action would be the developer’s
decision to defer other land purchases so that sufficient funds are available
eventually to purchase the six acres. Second, they may be private marketplace
transactions that are completed or consummated before the law, but which have no
particular protected legal status vis-a-vis the new law. An example would be the
developer’s purchase of the land when the law permitted one-half acre building
sites. The land purchase has legal status, and was likely made because the
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developer had an expectation that twelve homes could be built there. But the land
purchase, alone, probably cannot prevent future application of a two-acre
minimum size requirement. Third, they may be private actions that are both
completed and given protected legal status before adoption o f the new law. If the
developer not only purchased the six acres, but also successfully had the land
platted by the appropriate planning authorities for 12 lots before adoption o f the
two acre per lot limitation, the developer would have completed a transaction (the
purchase) with possibly protected legal status (the platting) prior to the new law.
When a new law is adopted that addresses the same subject as the old law,
and when private actions have taken place under the old law, several outcomes are
possible. The easiest case (Case I) to predict is when the new law is not meant to
be retroactivity applied to past private actions, even in the future. This can occur
explicitly, when the maker of the new law includes in it a grandfather clause or a
“subject to valid existing rights” provision. It may also occur implicitly, when the
new is interpreted to apply only prospectively.
A more difficult case (Case II) occurs when the past private action has
resulted in the creation of a legally enforceable substantive right or duty prior to
adoption of the new law, and when the new law affects that right or duty. The
new law can affect the right or duty by (1) voiding it or making it unenforceable,
(2) abolishing it and replacing it with a new right or duty, or (3) modifying or
impairing it. If the new law does any of the above, and if it is operative for a time
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prior to the effective date of the new law, the new law has primary retroactivity
and is usually void.
If the new law affects pre-existing rights or duties only in the future, it has
secondary retroactivity. If the past rights and duties have protected legal status
with respect to the new law with future effect (typically because they are afforded
protection by some constitutional principle, such as the Takings Clause), the new
law has protected legal status retroactivity, and will likely be void. See, e.g., Skip
Kirchdorfer, Inc. v. U.S., 6 F.3d 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Blumberg v. Pinellas
County, 836 F. Supp. 839 (M.D.Fla. 1993). If the past rights and duties have not
protected legal status, the new law has simple secondary retroactivity. Such
secondary retroactivity is often viewed by courts as equivalent to prosectivity.
Laws with exclusively future effect which change the consequences o f past private
actions which have no protected legal status (particularly under the Takings
Clause) are usually able to resist a retroactivity challenge. See, e.g., Costanino v.
TRW, Inc., 13 F.3d 969 (6th Cir. 1994).
The most difficult case (Case III) is when there is some past private action
which has not yet matured into a substantive legal right or duty, but which was
initially undertaken in reliance on the old law. A new law may impose unexpected
future legal effects on such past events. When this past private action has no past
legal effect (e.g., a developer who defers economic decisions in anticipation of
taking future action consistent with the old law), the new law may affect the
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future consequences of this past action, and thereby thwart expectations that may
have arisen from the action. This is permissible secondary retroactivity. But when
this past action has some past legal consequence (e.g., when the developer
purchases land in reliance on the old law, or when the developer purchases land
and receives platting from the county), then future applications of the new law to
the antecedent facts (secondary retroactivity) may not only defeat private
expectations, but also interfere with the legal status of the past action. Such “legal
status” retroactivity is similar to secondary retroactivity because it affects the
future legal consequences of past actions. Although secondary retroactivity is
normally acceptable (and often classified as prospectivity), the “legal status” form
of secondary retroactivity will be impermissible if the new law interferes with past
private action which has “protected” legal status with respect to the new law.
Protected legal status may occur when the past actions may not have
ripened into a legally protected right or duty, such as a property or contract right,
but which may nonetheless have sufficient legal consequence in relationship to the
new law to resist its application. In the case of the developer who contemplates
the purchase of six acres of land for the building of 12 homes, the mere purchase
of the land has legal status, but probably not sufficient legal status to protect the
developer from imposition of a subsequent two-acre minimum lot size
requirement. However, the purchase of land, coupled with county approval of a
plat for the land with 12 building sites, may have enough protected legal status to
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prevent the new two-acre lot size rule from applying to the platted land. This is
because a legally approved plat with 12 building sites on six acres may be
considered a vested property right, which would be interfered with by a rule
imposing a two-acre minimum lot size on the six acres.
There are, then, two kinds of legal status for purposes of retroactivity.
Non-protected legal status describes a private action that has a legal effect, but not
in relation to the new law. Protected legal status is when a private action not only
has a legal effect, but also a legal effect capable of defeating secondary retroactive
application of the new law. A private action characterized as having protected
legal status may be immunized from secondary retroactivity if that action is seen
as a constitutionally protected "substantive" right or duty, such as a contract right,
In re Workers Compensation Refund, 842 F. Supp. 1211 (D. Minn. 1994), or a
property right protected by the Takings Clause. Shelden v. U.S., 7 F.3d 1022
(Fed. Cir. 1993). If a private party cannot prove the existence of such a
substantive legal right or duty having protected legal status, the party may still
prevent secondary retroactive application of the new law if the party can
successfully allege that the action otherwise subject to the new law has one of two
kinds of protected legal status.
First, a private action is likely to have protected legal status if it is deemed
to be a "vested right.” The term is conclusory, and "there are no bright line tests to
determine what constitutes a vested right or when that right accrues." Some courts
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assume that a vested right must be a complete and consummated right to present
and future use or enjoyment, which is not a mere expectation based on a
continuance of existing law, and where the interest does not depend upon an
uncertain event or period. In determining whether a new law impairs vested rights
in the future, other courts do not focus on whether there is a "right” that is
"vested," but whether the law defeats bonafide reasonable intentions, or surprises
persons who have long relied on a contrary state of law. See, e.g., Mamcopa
County v. Arizona, 866 P.2d 158 (Ariz. 1993).
Second, some courts are willing to confer on past actions protected legal
status when the new rule makes worthless substantial past investment incurred in
reliance upon a prior rule which either encouraged or in some way authorized the
past actions. In this second case, the question of protected legal status retroactivity
is not judged according to whether there is a vested right, but on whether the
secondary retroactivity is reasonable, or equitable. See, e.g., Hy Kom
Development Co. v. Manatee Cty, 837 F. Supp. 1182 (M.D.Fla. 1993).
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NEW LAW

OLD LAW

Private Action

expectations but no right/duty

Inapplicable to all past private action

Private Action

right/duty

Inapplicable to all past actions resulting in
right/duty

Private Action

right/duty

Private Action

right/duty

Private Action

r i g h t / d uty

Private Action

right/duty

Private Action

right/duty

Private Action

right/duty

CASE I

deny, void, make unenforceable or
illegal right/duty

CASE I

APPLICATION O F NEW LAW

Prospectivity

Impermissible

Primary Retroactivity
deny, void or make unenforceable or illegal
right/duty

4

DEFINITION

right/duty abolished and replaced
with new right/duty

Secondary Retroactivity
Primary Retroactivity

right/duty abolished and replaced with new
right/duty
right/duty impaired or modified

Secondary Retroactivity
Primary Retroactivity

Impermissible

Permissible
Impermissible
Permissible
Impermissible

right/duty impaired or modified

Secondary Retroactivity

Permissible

right/duty with protected
l egal status under
constitutional law

right/duty impaired, modified, or abolished

Secondary Retroactivity
with
Protected Legal Status

Impermissible

Private Action

| expectations, plans and transactions without legal effect

expectations altered or defeated

Secondary Retroactivity

Permissible

Private Action

j completed transactions with legal effect

expectations from completed transactions
altered or defeated

Secondary Retroactivity
with
Non-Protected Legal
Status

Permissible

expectations from completed transactions
altered or defeated

Secondary Retroactivity
with
Protected Legal Status

Impermissible

investments made worthless

Secondary Retroactivity
with
Protected legal Status

Impermissible

Private Action

CASE III

Private Action

Private Action

completed transactions creating vested rights

completed transactions and investments made in reasonable
reliance on old law

game

Nature of “New” 1995 Law

1990 Law [Private Conduct]

1960 Law [Old County Law]
(zoned 1/2 acre lot size)
•
•

P rosp ectiv itv

1995 Law [New County Law]
(rezoned 2 acre lot size)
6 acres purchased by developer Only 3 homes permitted on the 6
12 homes built by developer on acres purchases.
Effective only for private
12 sites of 1/2 acre
transactions completed after 1995.
Effective in 1995, subject to vaid
existing rights.

(Past legal consequences of past
private actions)

• 6 acres purchased
• 12 homes built on 12 sites of
1/2 acre

S econdary R etroactively

•

Prim ary R etroactively

(Future legal consequences of past
private actions which have ripened
into a right/duty, which do not have
protected legal status)
S econdary R etroactively

(Future legal consequences of past
private actions which have ripened
into a right/duty, which do have
protected legal status)

•
•

6 acres purchased
Contract with county to supply
water, sewage, and roads for
12 homes
• Sales Ks with 12 home buyers
Plans, preliminary decisions,
money set aside to purchase 6
acres

(Expectations and plans without legal
effect)
•
•

(Completed transactions creating
vested rights)
Secon d ary R etroactively w ith
P rotected L egal Status

(Completed transactions made in
reliance on old law)

6 acres purchased (expectation
that 12 homes possible)
Effective in 1995

S econdary R etroactively w ith
N on-P rotected Legal Status

S econ d ary R etroactively w ith
P rotected L egal S tatu s

Effective in 1960

6 acres purchased
County platting for 12 sites and
county issuance of 12 building
permits

County assurances that 12
homes would be acceptable on
6 acres
• 6 acres purchased

Effective in 1995

Effective in 1995

Effective in 1995

•

Effective in 1995

